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COMMENTS ON JURY NULLIFICATION
Judge John W. Bissellt
At the Spring 1997 Symposium, Judge John W. Bissell argued rigor-
ously against jury nullification. According to Judge Bissell, lawyers and
judges take oaths to honor and administer the rule of law. To ignore the
law and render an ad hoc decision, which occurs with jury nullification,
is a gross perversion of the legal system. Judge Bissell argued that jury
nullification should not be used as a defense strategy. A jury trial has
various participants: judge, advocates, parties, witnesses, and jury.
Each participant plays a separate and distinct role. Allowing jury nulli-
fication would place the jury in the improper position of the "second
defender." The Judge also argued that as it would be clearly improper
for prosecutors to suggest nullification to a jury, defense attorneys
should not be allowed to do so either.
Citing a well known quote, "Law must be stable and yet it cannot
stand still, " the judge argued that jury nullification would destabilize the
legal system. Furthermore, to advocate jury nullification in the criminal
law context and not in the civil law context is inconsistent. Such an ap-
proach would confer greater discretion, freedom, and power on jurors in
criminal cases than on those hearing civil cases. Such inconsistency has
no support either in logic or in the history of our legal system.
Following up on the symposium discussion, and citing a subsequent
case on the issue, Judge Bissell offers further support for his position
against jury nullification:
I am pleased to draw your attention to a Second Circuit Opinion
issued slightly more than two months after the symposium, which em-
phatically rejects the proposition of jury nullification.'
Indeed, the Thomas case provides an interesting microcosm for sev-
eral significant jury issues which were addressed during the symposium.
In Thomas, during voir dire, an African-American juror (Juror No. 5)
survived a Batson challenge, albeit based on erroneous reasoning by the
trial judge. 2 During the course of trial, conduct attributed to Juror No. 5
led the trial judge to consider excusing him "for just cause" under Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(b)3. The judge conducted in camera
t Judge Bissell sits on the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.
1 See United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 1997).
2 Id. at 609 n.4.
3 See id. at 610.
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interviews with the jurors, heard arguments of counsel and, because the
trial was near conclusion, decided to retain the juror.4 The difficulties
with Juror No. 5, however, did not end. His allegedly disruptive conduct
during deliberations led to an additional in camera interview of each ju-
ror by the trial judge.5 Although the reports of the jurors were somewhat
conflicting, a synopsis of those reports is as follows:
One juror described [Juror No. 5 as ] hollering at fellow
jurors, another said he had called his fellow jurors rac-
ists, and two jurors told the court that Juror No. 5 had
come close to striking a fellow juror.6
*.. On the one hand, one juror described Juror No.
5 as favoring acquittal because the defendants were his
"people," another suggested that it was because Juror
No. 5 thought the defendants were good people, two
others stated that Juror No. 5 favored acquittal because
he thought that the defendants had engaged in the al-
leged criminal activity out of economic necessity. 7
After hearing further arguments from counsel, including the govern-
ment's position that a jury nullification issue had arisen, the trial judge
excused Juror No. 5.8 The most important basis for that decision was
summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:
Most importantly, however, the [trial] court found that
Juror No. 5 was ignoring the evidence in favor of his
own, preconceived ideas about the case:
I believe after hearing everything that
[Juror No. 5's] motives are immoral,
that he believes that these folks have a
right to deal drugs because they don't
have any money, they are in a disadvan-
taged situation and probably that's the
thing to do. And I don't think he would
convict them no matter what the evi-
dence was.
The court found that Juror No. 5 was refusing to convict
"because of preconceived, fixed, cultural, economic, [or]
social . . . reasons that are totally improper and
impermissible."9
4 See id. at 610-11.
5 See id. at 611.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 See id. at 612.
9 Id. (Court of Appeals quoting the trial court and drawing conclusions).
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The jury later returned a verdict finding several defendants guilty on
all counts, others guilty on some counts and not guilty on others, one
defendant not guilty on all counts, plus a deadlock on one count as to one
of the defendants. 10 Five of the defendants, convicted on some or all
counts against them appealed the convictions based on the dismissal of
Juror No. 5.11 In the latter portions of the Opinion, the court explored in
depth the propriety and manner of inquiry into the deliberations of the
jury in order to determine whether there was just cause to replace the
juror at that time. The Second Circuit concluded as follows:
On this record, we cannot say that it is beyond doubt that
Juror No. 5's position during deliberations was the result
of his defiant unwillingness to apply the law as opposed
to his reservations about the sufficiency of the Govern-
ment's case against the defendants.1
2
Before reaching that conclusion, however, the court made it very
clear that a juror may not judge the law and purposefully disregard the
trial judge's instruction in order to reach a decision of his own choosing.
Finding support from numerous sources, the Second Circuit held:
Here, [the judge] identified a different form of bias
as the primary ground for dismissing Juror No. 5 - one
arising not from an external event or from a relationship
between a juror and a party, but rather, from a more gen-
eral opposition to the application of the criminal narcot-
ics laws to the defendants' conduct. In the court's view,
Juror no. 5 believed that the defendants had "a right to
deal drugs." Based on what the court described as the
juror's "preconceived, fixed, cultural, economic, [or] so-
cial.., reasons that are totally improper and impermissi-
ble," the court concluded that Juror No. 5 was unlikely
to convict the defendants "no matter what the evidence
was." Essentially, the judge found that Juror No. 5 in-
tended to engage in a form of "nullification," a practice
whereby a juror votes in purposeful disregard of the evi-
dence, defying the court's instructions on the law.
We take this occasion to restate some basic princi-
ples regarding the character of our jury system. "Nullifi-
cation is, by definition, a violation of a juror's oath to
apply the law as instructed by the court - in the words
of the standard oath administered to jurors in the federal
10 See id.
11 See id.
12 Id. at 624.
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courts, to "render a true verdict according to the law and
the evidence." We categorically reject the idea that, in a
society committed to the rule of law, jury nullification is
desirable or that courts may permit it to occur when it is
within their authority to prevent. Accordingly, we con-
clude that a juror who intends to nullify the applicable
law is no less subject to dismissal than is a juror who
disregards the court's instructions due to an event or re-
lationship that renders him biased or otherwise unable to
render a fair and impartial verdict.
13
The court explored the classic example of John Peter Zenger, as
well as Bushell's Case14 in which Mr. Clay S. Conrad, at the symposium,
found considerable support for jury nullification. The court, however,
made an important distinction:
[A]s the quotation from the Supreme Court's opinion in
Standefer15 indicates, in the language originally em-
ployed by Judge Learned Hand, the power of juries to
nullify or exercise a power of lenity is just that - a
power; it is by no means a right or something that a
judge should encourage or permit if it is within his au-
thority to prevent.
1 6
The Second Circuit found additional support for this proposition from a
D.C. Circuit opinion 17 issued by a panel which included now Supreme
Court Justice Ginsburg. Quoting that court, the Second Circuit stated:
A jury has no more "right" to find a "guilty" defendant
"not guilty" than it has to find a "not guilty" defendant
guilty, and the fact that the former cannot be corrected
by a court, while the latter can be, does not create a right
out of the power to misapply the law. Such verdicts are
lawless, a denial of due process and constitute an exer-
cise of erroneously seized power.18
13 Id. at 614 (citing FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DisTRmIcr COURT
JUDGES 225 (4th ed. 1996) (emphasis supplied), when referring to the standard oath adminis-
tered to jurors in the federal courts).
14 See Thomas, 116 F.3d at 614-15.
15 Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 (1980).
16 Thomas, 116 F.3d at 615.
17 See United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
18 Thomas, 116 F.3d at 615-16 (quoting Washington, 705 F.2d at 494). The Second
Circuit also noted that "the exercise of [such] de facto power is a violation of a juror's sworn
duty to apply the law as interpreted by the court." Id. (citing United States v. Boardman, 419
F.2d 110, 116 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1970)).
In addition, footnote number nine in Thomas cited many relevant cases:
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Finally, in delineating the duties of a federal trial judge the Second
Circuit held:
If it is true that the jury's prerogatives of lenity in-
troduces a slack into the enforcement of law, tempering
its rigor by the mollifying influences of current ethical
conventions as part and parcel of the system of checks
and balances embedded in the very structure of the
American criminal trial, there is a countervailing duty
and authority on the judge to assure that jurors follow
the law. Although nullification may sometimes succeed
-- because, [inter alia], it does not come to the attention
of [the] presiding judge before the completion of a jury's
work, and jurors are not answerable for nullification af-
ter the verdict has been reached - it would be a derelic-
tion of duty for a judge to remain indifferent to reports
that a juror is intent on violating his oath. This is true
regardless of the juror's motivation for "nullification,"
including race, ethnicity or similar considerations. A
federal judge, whose own oath of office required the
judge to "faithfully and impartially discharge and per-
form all the duties incumbent upon [the judge].., under
the Constitution and laws of the United Stated," may not
ignore colorable claims that a juror is acting on the basis
of such improper considerations. 19
What clearly emerges from the Thomas opinion is a realization that
while juries have a power to nullify which, because of the nature of a
jury deliberation, may go undetected, it is not a right enjoyed either by
the jury or by a party to any lawsuit. Such decisions, in the language
endorsed by Justice (then Circuit Judge) Ginsburg, "are lawless, a denial
of due process and constituting an exercise of erroneously seized
power."20 No jury or juror has the right to purposefully disregard the
court's instructions on the law applicable to a case, including the instruc-
Accordingly, criminal defendants have no right to a jury instruction alerting
jurors to this power to act in contravention of their duty. See United States v. Ed-
wards, 101 F.3d 17, 19-20 (2d Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Sepulveda, 15
F.3d 1161, 1190 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1223 (1994); Dougherty, 473
F. 2d at 1136-37. As the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recognized, to in-
struct on nullification "would... undermine(] the impartial determination of justice
based on law." United States v. Krzyke, 836 F.2d 1013, 1021 (6th Cir.) (finding no
error in court's response to jury on nullification that included the admonition to the
jury: "You would violate your oath and the law if you willfully brought in a verdict
contrary to the law given you in this case."), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 832 (1988).
Thomas, 116 F.3d at 616 n.9 (some citations omitted).
19 Id. at 616 (citations omitted).
20 Washington, 705 F.2d at 494.
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tion that the law must be followed. Finally, a trial judge has the duty to
prevent such an event by employing the powers available to the judge
under the law, including applicable rules of court.
While I certainly endorse the ruling of the Second Circuit (particu-
larly the guidance and support which that decision provides to a trial
judge), I realize that this debate is far from ended. Although the Opinion
unequivocally condemns jury nullification, one must remember that it
arose in the context of one juror's effort at nullification. Advocates of
jury nullification would probably remind us that the recalcitrance of Ju-
ror No. 5 could have frustrated the will of the vast majority (the other
eleven members) of the jury. Any significant distinction between jury
and juror nullification was not explored at the symposium, but such a
distinction would be an interesting topic to address in the future.
